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# Japan: A Bandwagoning "Lopsided Power"

*Yukiko Miyagi*

Japan gave active support to the United States in the Iraq War: condemning the Iraqi regime and seeking UN legitimization of US policy before the war; and afterward providing reconstruction assistance, including the dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq. This was the first time since World War II that the Japanese military had been deployed in an area of overseas combat, causing a nationwide controversy over its constitutionality. The issue at stake in 2003 was not some remote Iraqi threat, but rather a test of Japan's fidelity to its US alliance, the very centerpiece of its security against threats from East Asia. It also reflected a decision to rely on US hegemony in the Middle East to secure Japan's access to energy supplies. And the war was seen as an opportunity to normalize the use of Japanese military power as a step in throwing off the constraints that made Japan a lopsided power with an abnormal asymmetry between its economic and political/military power.

## ■ Japan's Position on the War

### ***Prewar Policy***

Until early March 2003, Japan's official stand was the search for a peaceful resolution of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue. Ostensibly working toward this end, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi demanded the Iraqi regime's unconditional acceptance and full cooperation with the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) inspections and sent special envoys to the leading Arab states to increase pressure on Iraq for acceptance. In reality, aware of the US determination on war regardless of Iraq's behavior, Japan tried to convince Washington to secure a UN resolution on the basis of the WMD threat Iraq supposedly posed, rather than acting unilaterally with the aim of regime

change. This, Japan advised, would frame the issue as one of the international community against Iraq rather than as a US attack on Iraq. A UN resolution was also important to gaining Japanese domestic support for the dispatch of its Self-Defense Forces, in that it would legitimize it as a contribution to Japan's international obligations.<sup>1</sup> To give the appearance of exhausting all peaceful means of resolving the crisis, special envoys were sent to Iraq urging compliance. Iraq asked the Japanese prime minister's special envoy, sent on 3 March 2003, to make a sincere effort for a nonmilitary resolution of the crisis, as Japan was doing in the case of North Korea, but Japan contented itself with the mere delivery of demands on Iraq.<sup>2</sup> As the US intention to launch a military attack even without a UN resolution became apparent during US secretary of state Colin Powell's visit to Tokyo on 22–23 February 2003, the Japanese government advised the United States to use twelve-year-old Resolutions 678 and 687 as the legal basis for war.<sup>3</sup> It also stepped up its efforts to get support for the US draft resolution authorizing war through bilateral contacts with states on the Security Council and, in particular, by offering economic assistance to undecided nonpermanent members of the council.

### ***Wartime Policy***

Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed his government's support for the US announcement on 17 March 2003 that it would go to war without a UN resolution. Japan immediately began diplomatic efforts to secure a UN resolution on postwar Iraq. It also tried to defuse Arab anger by promising humanitarian assistance for Iraq and economic assistance for the Palestinian refugees and Jordan. The absence of a UN resolution made it impossible for the government to offer financial and logistical support for the US military attack itself, but it enlarged its support for US-allied forces in the Indian Ocean established during the 2001 war in Afghanistan; this included the dispatch of an Aegis-equipped naval vessel that could be used to give intelligence support for US military operations, an act that potentially breached the constitutional prohibition on participation in offensive military actions.<sup>4</sup> The contradictions in Japan's policy were exposed by its stands during the war. It rejected the appeal of the Iraqi deputy ambassador for Japanese intervention to halt the indiscriminate US missile attacks and cluster-bombings on civilian residences and hospitals while claiming to adhere to a policy of peaceful conflict resolution and ostentatiously offering "humanitarian assistance" to the Iraqi people.<sup>5</sup> Japan's initiatives were, in contrast to the Gulf War (1990–1991), quickly formulated and implemented, having been preplanned since the time a US military attack on Iraq appeared on Washington's agenda.

### ***Postwar Policy***

Japan's first priority after the war was to secure a UN resolution on postwar reconstruction that would secure the passage of domestic legislation allow-

ing the dispatch of the SDF.<sup>6</sup> Following the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, on the reconstruction of Iraq, Japan passed the Iraq Reconstruction Law in July 2003, enabling the dispatch of about 1,000 SDF troops to Iraq to carry out reconstruction assistance. The Japanese government was determined to send the Japanese troops despite a high risk of casualties and despite Al-Qaida's threat to attack Tokyo, and was not deterred by the murder of two Japanese diplomats. To reduce domestic reaction, it incrementally staged the troops' dispatch beginning in December 2003. However, domestic skepticism over the legitimacy of SDF activities in Iraq forced the government to shift its initial emphasis on the SDF mission from one of providing logistical support for the occupation forces to one focused on rehabilitation and reconstruction. Also, keen to show leadership in undertaking the reconstruction of Iraq, Japan cochaired the US-led international donor conference held in Madrid on 23–24 October 2003 and itself pledged \$5 billion, the second largest financial contribution after the United States and representing nearly 10 percent of the total sum called for by the United States.

In the wake of the war, the Japanese government, anxious to protect the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Japan and to ward off terrorist attacks in retaliation for its support of Washington, redoubled its efforts to appease Arab opinion. Viewing support for the Middle East peace process as an effective means to counter Arab and Muslim perceptions of Japan as totally aligned with the United States, Japan called for a return to the internationally backed "roadmap" peace plan in opposition to the Bush administration's support for Sharon's policy of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories; Japan also broke ranks with the United States in condemning the Israeli government's assassinations of Palestinian leaders. To secure the safety of the SDF in Iraq, Japan assured Middle Eastern governments and publics (via Al-Jazeera) of its purely nonmilitary mission, and sought friendly relations with local Iraqi communities (by providing assistance and some employment). The Iraqi population, however, largely interpreting Japan's role as participation in the US occupation of Iraq and believing Japan to be partly motivated by the hope of economic gain from Iraq's reconstruction, had an increasingly ambivalent view of Japan—a client of the United States that had supported the military attack but also a source of much needed assistance in the reconstruction of Iraq.<sup>7</sup>

## ■ Japan's Position Explained

### *Systemic Structural Determinants*

*Japan's security dependence on the United States.* Global structural factors, and specifically Japan's position in a US-dominated unipolar world order, provided the context of its support for the United States in the Iraq



War. Japan's lop-sided combination of large economic resources with only limited military capability—dictated by its US-designed 1947 Peace Constitution—had generated a dual policy of relying on international institutions for global security and on the United States for its military security in East Asia. Japan's stake in its security alliance with the United States had increased with its perception of a growing threat from North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China. As the United States—especially under George W. Bush—tried to make its military power the basis of global order at the expense of liberal institutions centered on the UN, Japan was made more dependent on the United States for its security and correspondingly more vulnerable to US demands to use its substantial resources in support of US policy. At the same time, a world order based more on military power generated a powerful incentive for Japan to recover a more “natural” balance between economic and military power, without which its global political influence remained limited. The Iraq War was perceived as an opportunity to both reinforce the US security alliance and to redress this lopsidedness by deploying military forces abroad. Also, Japanese policy was shaped by the desire to gain influence in Washington in the hope that US policy would be more sensitive to Japan's interests: notably that it would tolerate Japan's stake in Iran's Azadegan oil field, that it would back Japan's ambition for a UN Security Council seat, and that it would heed Japan's counsels to avoid a war over North Korea's nuclear capability. One could say Japan was prepared to support a war in the Middle East in order to avoid one in East Asia.<sup>8</sup>

*Economic dependence on the Middle East.* Japan's deep dependence on Middle Eastern oil, for which it had long relied on good relations with Middle Eastern countries, was another structural constraint potentially shaping its policy; but dependence by itself does not determine the means pursued to address it. While in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war Japan had distanced itself from US policies (particularly its pro-Israeli biases) that might antagonize Middle Eastern oil-producing states, by the time of the Iraq War this constraint had eased. For one thing, Japan's former important oil relationship with Iraq was now negligible due to the damage of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Gulf War (1990–1991), and the effects of subsequent US sanctions against Iraq.<sup>9</sup> After the Gulf War, Iraq became for Japan mainly a card to play in bargaining with the United States over Japan's wish to continue its much more important oil relation with Iran despite US attempts to isolate the latter.<sup>10</sup> While alignment with the United States in a war opposed by the Arab and Muslim public was a risk,<sup>11</sup> most of the oil producers were bandwagoning with the United States, not opposing it as in 1973; Japan had also reached agreements with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran in September 2001 to guard against any short-term interruption in oil

supplies. And bandwagoning with the United States in the Iraq War might, on the other hand, permit Japan to share in the economic spoils of the war and to secure a share of Iraqi oil under the umbrella of US hegemony in the region.

### ***The Domestic Policy Process***

***Elite goals.*** Elite-specific norms and interests were the immediate driving force in policymaking. Japanese policymakers' experience of growing international demands for Japan's financial contributions in international crises, which when given did not earn Japan due respect from the other great powers, fueled an urge to regain the full power, influence, and respect they felt Japan deserved.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, the value of the US security umbrella was largely unquestioned in elite circles. The elite had been traumatized by the heavy US criticism of Japan's "too little, too late" response during the Gulf War;<sup>13</sup> the solution, it believed, was a proactive and visible response to international crises, both to satisfy the United States and as an opportunity to deploy military force abroad. On the other hand, there was also some fear among the elite that US power might be exercised in ways damaging to Japanese interests; specifically, Koizumi, having personally initiated attempts at normalization of relations with North Korea, had a strong stake in sustaining the influence with the United States that was needed to avoid a US war against Pyongyang or a crisis that would stir up Japanese fears of North Korea to the detriment of the government. The elites' policies were also tempered by some disagreement among themselves over how far to go along the path of total alignment with Washington and by the antimilitary national norms dominant among the mass public.

***The inner policymaking circle: the ruling party and senior bureaucrats.*** The ultimate decisions in the Iraq War were made by the top political leaders, primarily by Prime Minister Koizumi, who was the main driver behind Japan's initiatives, including the major break with precedent: deployment of the SDF to a combat zone.<sup>14</sup> Koizumi's particular political position in some ways explains this. On the one hand, lacking a strong personal faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Koizumi was keen to show himself indispensable to the US-Japan relationship; on the other hand, his ability to impose his views owed much to his extraordinarily high public popularity rating, upon which the LDP depended to stay in power.<sup>15</sup> Giving key backing to the prime minister was the rising group of pro-US military activists within the LDP leadership fostered by his cabinet appointments; the foreign ministry, whose top ranks were imbued by a pro-US culture; and the national defense agency, which had been established in close affiliation with US counterparts and whose rising status

within the government paralleled Japan's attempt to expand its military role. Given his personal public standing, his privileged access to the United States, and his support within the military-industrial complex, Koizumi was able to centralize sufficient power in the cabinet institution to override elite and mass opposition.<sup>16</sup> The exceptionally powerful political position of the Koizumi cabinet also encouraged bandwagoning by senior bureaucrats seeking his support for their favored policies.<sup>17</sup>

The prime minister was not completely free from intraparty opposition. There were two opposing tendencies within the ruling LDP, one that was resentful of the way his policymaking style bypassed traditional consensus building within the party,<sup>18</sup> and one that objected to his evasion of any discussion of the constitutionality of the government's policy and that believed involvement in the war carried more costs and risks than opportunities. When policymaking required Diet approval, the government had no choice but to seek intraparty consensus through compromise as well as intimidation of internal opponents in order to ensure passage of the needed legislation. However, the government's relative success in pushing through its policy exposed how far the coming of Koizumi had eclipsed the influence of the traditional mainstream Diet members who favored more cautious, self-restrained, and moderate policies, particularly regarding the use of the SDF, in favor of promilitarist Diet members pushing for rapid recovery of Japanese military power.

*The ruling coalition.* When the war crisis occurred, the LDP governed in coalition with two much smaller parties, the New Conservative Party and the Komeito. The New Conservative Party, having split from the LDP, had no significant policy differences with it over the Iraq War. The Komeito had originally stood for a UN-centered and antimilitarist policy but followed the LDP line, even to the point of risking its main public support base.<sup>19</sup> It was motivated by the urge to survive in a slowly emerging two-party system, and this was believed to require being more accountable to establishment interests than to its original political base, the mass public, and middle-sized and small business; additionally, there was a trade-off agreed between Komeito and the LDP in which the Komeito received concessions on tax legislation for its constituents in return for support of Koizumi on the Iraqi issue.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the coalition parties received certain concessions on Iraq from the LDP—such as the delaying and phasing of the SDF dispatch and refraining from logistical support for US forces in postwar Iraq. In effect, the coalition parties added a number of Diet seats to the support of the LDP while providing a very minimal check on its policy.

*The Diet and the opposition parties.* The LDP-led coalition's absolute majority in the Diet allowed it to suppress the proper consultative and



debating functions of parliament. This could be seen in the passage of the Iraq Reconstruction Law, in which only a short time was allowed for deliberation and in which voting took place in the absence of opposition protesters. The largest opposition party, the Democratic Party, stood against a war without a UN resolution, and therefore against the government's pro-US stance and against SDF participation in the US-led reconstruction of Iraq. But it lacked the intraparty policy cohesion to translate its relatively large number of Diet seats into effective opposition. While the smaller opposition parties, the Communist Party and the Socialist Democratic Party, were staunchly against the war, their seats had declined to the point where the LDP could ignore them in the policymaking process.

*Business interests.* As a part of "iron triangle" dominating Japanese policymaking, the business community has close ties with and great influence on policymakers, although public criticism of this relation had made it more circumspect. Most business leaders expected a war in Iraq to have a negative effect on the economy and their businesses from increased oil prices and reduced investment and exports.<sup>21</sup> However, viewing the US determination on war as unchangeable, they focused on how to minimize the negative effect and how to make profitable use of it. The business sectors most enthusiastic for participation in the US war coalition were Japan's overdeveloped construction industry, which hoped for contracts,<sup>22</sup> and the general business companies that had had business in Iraq in the 1980s or, having a military industry section, welcomed increases in defense spending along with the SDF's future expanded role. They believed clear support of the United States and the early dispatch of the SDF would gain a substantial share in the postwar reconstruction contracts allocated by the United States, and there was some impatience among them at the government's delay in deploying the SDF in the face of public opposition.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, the Japanese oil business was relatively more cautious and reluctant to engage in Iraq, seeing investment there as highly risky.<sup>24</sup> The failure of the United States to stabilize Iraq has made all Japanese firms more cautious, but many remain optimistic about longer-run opportunities.

*The normative disjuncture between policymakers and the mass public.* The ruling elites' main dilemma was that their foreign policy priorities, including their policy in Iraq, pursued in defiance of long-standing national norms, enjoyed little or only reluctant public support. To legitimize their agenda they attempted to stretch existing normative constraints and to use global crises, of which the Iraq War was a major opportunity, to promote fait accompli embodying new norms they hoped the public would come to accept.

In the Iraq War, the Koizumi government could not initially exploit the



justification for involvement in war employed at the time of the Gulf War, namely the need of Japan to contribute to the international community as embodied in the UN, since no UN resolution was forthcoming justifying an attack on Iraq and about 78 percent of the Japanese public were against the US attack on Iraq.<sup>25</sup> Instead the government emphasized the importance of the US-alliance for Japan, exploiting the growing national sense of regional insecurity (particularly from North Korea), while playing down, for fear of provoking a nationalist backlash, US pressures on Japan. There was no alternative for Japan, the government insisted, and to oppose the United States would undermine Japan's national interests. The public, while reluctantly acknowledging this, did not abandon its basic preference for liberal international institutions. UN legitimization, however, was provided for Japan's participation in Iraq's reconstruction,<sup>26</sup> and the public was prepared to tolerate Japan's financial contributions (which were only constrained by budgetary considerations) and humanitarian assistance, even outside a UN framework. Koizumi wanted more, however, namely the dispatch of the SDF to postwar Iraq. To this end, he tried to stretch the interpretation of the Japanese Peace Constitution, claiming that the preamble's stated "aspiration [of Japan] to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace" meant that Japan should gain international respect by sending Japanese troops for the purposes of international cooperation.<sup>27</sup> However, this reinterpretation of the constitution did not win public acceptance. The public did not support military involvement, constraining how far the SDF could be used in Iraq, although the government was able incrementally to shift their views toward its own. Thus, before the Iraq War started, about 70 percent were against SDF dispatch,<sup>28</sup> initially making it impossible to obtain a Diet majority for it. After the postwar SDF dispatch (facilitated by the reconstruction resolution), however, a May 2004 opinion poll showed that supporters of the dispatch briefly eclipsed opponents by 42 to 41 percent, and 43 percent of respondents thought the SDF was making an important international contribution, even though 52 percent still opposed the government's political support for the war. But in December 2004, opponents of the extension of the SDF mandate reached 58 percent, compared to 31 percent in support.<sup>29</sup> As it was difficult to shift public opinion to the point government leaders wanted, they tried to muffle debate,<sup>30</sup> claiming it was "against the national interest to tell the public in advance" what the government intended.<sup>31</sup> In dispatching the SDF, the prime minister expressed his determination to risk his political career for what he believed was right, and added that he was certain that the public would in the future understand his actions.

Yet while the public remained skeptical throughout of government policy, this translated into no political accountability of the government. One reason was the role of the media. The progovernment newspapers systemat-

ically promoted the government message, and although small in number, they included a powerful newspaper with the world's largest circulation.<sup>32</sup> In addition, national public television, while ostensibly neutral, relied heavily for its information on the Japanese and US governments.<sup>33</sup> Most newspapers and the widely watched, privately owned television news programs were in opposition to the US attack on Iraq and helped to maintain the critical domestic atmosphere. But the disproportionately heavy reporting on the US compared to that on the Middle East side tended to frame the issue in terms of Japan's relationship with the United States, limiting the scope of the debate so that media critics were unable to present a viable alternative to the government's policy.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the "lack of investigative reporting" by the Japanese media<sup>35</sup> meant the public was not exposed to information on vital matters such as the doubtful credibility of the WMD allegations made against Iraq or of the consequences of the war for international law and institutions. The government also promoted sympathetic reporting of the personal experiences of SDF troops in Iraq, generating public sympathy for their presence there and diluting public opposition to it.

Second, the active expression of public opposition over the Iraqi issue was ineffective, as public street protests, resolutions by local assemblies in opposition to the military attack, protests by local governors, a lawyers' lawsuit against the government, and a "human shield" of Japanese traveling to Iraq were all ignored by the government. In the end, the government prevailed because, while a majority opposed its policies on Iraq, this did not necessarily turn that majority against the government *per se*; thus an opinion poll showed that 26 percent of those who opposed the US invasion of Iraq nevertheless supported the government, with the majority of such supporters saying that there was no credible alternative to Koizumi.<sup>36</sup>

Third, the government actively manipulated public opinion. For example, when three Japanese citizens were kidnapped in Iraq, the government contrived to deflect attention from its own share in a war that had generated such insecurity in Iraq by blaming the victims for irresponsibly putting themselves in harm's way.

## ■ Policy Outputs and Consequences

Koizumi's policy in the Iraq War signaled another step in the post-Gulf War shift in Japan's role in the Middle East and the world. Japan moved from its traditional pacifistic policy toward joining the international power game on the side of the United States, and from the traditional practice of seeking to protect its own Middle Eastern interests from US pressure within liberal international institutions, above all the UN, toward weakening this institution in pursuit of its interests in tandem with the United States. In addition,

Japan made a step forward on the road to become a “normal” great power possessing military projection capability. It did not, yet, wholly abandon its traditional reliance on the UN and the principle of multilateralism, but its collaboration with the United States may have contributed to consolidation of a world order in which force plays an increased role at the expense of law.

Whether this has served Japan’s strong economic interest in sustaining oil supplies, gaining access to the Iraqi market, and maintaining its ties with the Arab world, however, seems questionable. Japan has burned many bridges with the Arab public while tying its regional role closely to US dominance in Iraq and the wider region. The government has sacrificed the historical benign image of Japan in the region, which had been earned by years of economic assistance and political neutrality.

Japan’s drive for international respect may also not have been served by the war. Stark inconsistencies in Japan’s policy—proclaiming commitment to the UN yet ignoring and manipulating it when it was expedient, projecting an image of a peaceful state while supporting an illegitimate military attack, depicting the dispatch of its military forces to the Arab and Iraqi people as a peaceful contribution while emphasizing the military nature of its cooperation to the United States—all risk damaging Japan’s international standing, and not just in the Middle East. Japan’s many bilateral diplomatic interventions in promotion of US policy, insofar as they were perceived as an effort to curry favor in Washington, have probably cost it international respect. For example, the Japanese elites’ push for a UN Security Council permanent seat seems to have been harmed by this erosion of respect.

The effects of the Iraq War on Japan remain ambiguous, and it is too early to tell whether the new assertiveness pioneered by the Koizumi government will be consolidated as a new national norm. It is possible, however, that a strong political leader has sufficiently established as normal what was previously thought to be abnormal, so that, in a similar crisis in the future, a similar Japanese response will be a matter of uncontested bureaucratic routine.

## ■ Notes

1. *Chunichi Shinbun*, 16 March 2003; *Asahi Shinbun*, 9 March 2003, 23 March 2003. In order to enable the SDF dispatch overseas, it would have to be either as a part of a UN peacekeeping operation under the Peacekeeping Operation Law, or at least based on a UN resolution under a new law to be passed for this particular occasion.

2. *Asahi Shinbun*, 8 March 2003.

3. Interview with a researcher at the Middle East Research Institute of Japan, 20 September 2005.



4. *Shukan Zenshin* no. 2082 (16 December 2002), [http://www.zenshin.org/f\\_zenshin/f\\_back\\_no02/f2082.htm](http://www.zenshin.org/f_zenshin/f_back_no02/f2082.htm).

5. *Asahi Shinbun*, 2 April 2003.

6. The resolution's call for contributions "by any means," including military assistance, was included at the specific request of the Japanese government. Interview with a researcher at the Middle East Research Institute of Japan, 20 September 2005.

7. *Tokyo Shinbun*, 16 January 2004, [http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/00/tokuho/20040116/mng\\_tokuho\\_000.shtml](http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/00/tokuho/20040116/mng_tokuho_000.shtml); *Weekly MDS (Movement for Democratic Socialism)* no. 825 (6 February 2004), [http://www.mdsweb.jp/doc/825/0825\\_08a.html](http://www.mdsweb.jp/doc/825/0825_08a.html).

8. Interview with a retired high-ranking foreign ministry official, 28 September 2005.

9. Japan's oil imports from Iraq in the month before the Iraq War were 0.3 percent of its total oil imports, and Japan had no investment in Iraq. Energy Agency, "Iraku Kougeki go no Sekiyu Jousei" [The Oil Situation After the Attack on Iraq], 21 March 2003, <http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/oil/index.htm>.

10. Interview with a researcher at the Institute of Developing Economy, Tokyo, 22 October 2003.

11. Japan's oil consumption in the early 2000s was 52 percent of its entire energy consumption, all imported and 85 percent from the Middle East. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, <http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/energy/oil/policy.html>.

12. For example, the elite thinks Japan is entitled to a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. *Chunichi Shinbun*, 14 March 2003; Foreign Minister Kawaguchi's speech to the 159th session of the Diet, 19 January 2004, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/kawaguchi/speech040119.htm>.

13. Naoto Amaki, *Saraba Gaimusho*, p. 78.

14. Conversation with a high-ranking Japanese foreign ministry official, 7 April 2004.

15. The Koizumi cabinet started with a popularity rating of around 80 percent, as opposed to the 20 percent typical of his predecessors, and remained above 40 percent even after his support for the US military attack, the passage of the Iraq Reconstruction Law, and the SDF dispatch to Iraq. Four months later, 73 percent of the respondents wanted Koizumi to stay in office, even though only 30 percent supported the LDP. *Asahi Shinbun*, 19 January 2004, 20 April 2004.

16. Tomohito Shinoda, *Kantei Gaiko*, pp. 34–50.

17. Amaki, *Saraba Gaimusho*, pp. 187, 218, 235, 249.

18. Shinoda, *Kantei Gaiko*, pp. 106–107.

19. *Rodo Shinbun*, 25 February 2003, <http://www.jlp.net/syasetu/030225b.html>.

20. Ibid.; Sadao Hirano, *Komeito-Soka Gakkai no Shinjitsu*, 2005, p. 56.

21. "Deflation, Management of Bad Credits, and Iraq: How Would the Business Leaders Confront the Accumulated Difficulty? Listening to Their Voices in the New Year," *Mainichi Shinbun*, 21 January 2003, <http://www.mainichi.co.jp/life/family/syuppan/economist/030121/1.html>.

22. The 21st Century Public Policy Institute, April 2003, <http://www.geocities.jp/ntt21c/0351x34u.html>; "Iraku Fukkou Shien ni Kansuru Kinkyuu Youbou" [Urgent Requests Regarding the Reconstruction Assistance for Iraq], Kaigai Kensetsu Kyoukai, Nihon Kensetsugyō Dantai Rengoukai, Nihon Doboku Kougyō Kyoukai, Kenchikugyō Kyoukai [Association of Overseas Construction

Business, the Japan League of Construction Groups, the Japan Association of Civil Engineering, and the Association of the Construction Business], June 2003, Japan Federation of Construction Contractors web page, [http://www.nikkenren.com/comment/r\\_2003\\_6.html](http://www.nikkenren.com/comment/r_2003_6.html); interview with representatives of the Japan Business Federation, International Cooperation Bureau, Latin America, Middle East, and Africa Group, 16 September 2005; interview with a representative of Japan Petroleum Development Association, 21 September 2005.

23. Sakae Tsuda, "Iraku no Fukkou Jigyō to Nihon" [The Reconstruction Business in Iraq and Japan], *Japan Mail Media* no. 214 (14 April 2003), <http://www.asyura.com/0304/war31/msg/1153.html>; Kazuyuki Hamada, *Iraku Sensou Nihon no Wakemae: Bijinesu to Shite no Jieitai Hahei* [Japan's Share in the Iraq War: The SDF Dispatch as Business], <http://www.esbooks.co.jp>.

24. Interview with an executive in the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, 21 October 2003; interview with a representative of Mitsui Co. Ltd., Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 20 November 2003.

25. *Asahi Shinbun*, 25 February 2003.

26. In response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement doubting the legitimacy of the Iraq War without a UN Security Council resolution, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi rejected his authority to interpret "what the UN Security Council members decided." On the other hand, in order to get public support for the SDF dispatch in Iraq, Annan was invited to Tokyo to express his appreciation of it. *Asahi Shinbun*, 25 March 2003.

27. Prime Minister Koizumi's press conference, 9 December 2003, <http://www.mofa.go.jp>; Prime Minister Koizumi's New Year's reflection, 1 January 2004, [http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2004/01/01syokan\\_e.html](http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2004/01/01syokan_e.html); Prime Minister Koizumi's speech to the 159th Diet session, 19 January 2004, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/speech040119.html>.

28. Takasi Tachibana, "Iraku Hahei no Taigi wo Tou" [Questioning the Justification for the Dispatch to Iraq], *Gendai*, March 2004, p. 29.

29. *Asahi Shinbun*, 25 February 2003, 11 December 2003, 15 March 2004, 20 December 2004; *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 2 June 2004, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp>.

30. Koizumi claimed that the public should not always be heeded, since it was often wrong in always preferring peace to war. *Asahi Shinbun*, 5 March 2003, 17 March 2003.

31. *Asahi Shinbun*, 14 February 2003.

32. Hiroshi Fujita, "Tayō na Iken wo Kousei ni Tsutaeta Ka: Yomiuri to Asahi, Mainichi, Sankei wo Hikaku, Bunseki Suru" [Did the Media Report the Various Opinions Fairly: The Comparison and Analysis of *Yomiuri*, *Asahi*, *Mainichi*, and *Sankei*], *Ronza*, November 2003, pp. 86–94.

33. Japan Communist Party member Hiroko Yada's web page, <http://www.hatta-hiroko.jp>.

34. Fujita, "Tayō na Iken wo Kousei ni Tsutaeta Ka," p. 93.

35. Ellis Krauss, "The Media's Role in a Changing Japanese Electorate," p. 7.

36. *Asahi Shinbun*, 11 September 2003, <http://www.asahi.com>.